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Paul Statham 
 
In Europe, over the last two decades, the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims has 
become the most significant form of demarcation in public debates and policies for minority 
politics (Koopmans 2013). Questions over whether Islam is compatible with liberal 
democratic values and societies, and by implication whether a significant presence of Muslim 
minorities is “problematic” resonate strongly. There are intense discussions over whether the 
supposed or real cultural/religious characteristics of Muslims impede integration in their own 
right, independently from socio-economic factors (Statham and Tillie 2016). Atrocities by 
perpetrators acting in the name of “Islamic state” are depressingly common across the 
continent, often committed by second-generation Muslims born in Europe. This has led to 
increasing political demands for Muslims to identify with their countries of settlement and 
accept so-called “core” liberal-democratic values in the domains of democracy, separation of 
church and state, and gender equality. However, barriers to peaceful co-existence and social 
cohesion also result from a lack of acceptance of cultural/religious differences among 
significant parts of the majority population. Such majority opposition can range from tacit 
avoidance of Muslims in everyday life to outright hostility and Islamophobia. 
 
In a volume on how Muslims of immigrant origin and their offspring fare in their societies of 
settlement, this chapter addresses questions of their acculturation as well as resistance to this 
from majority populations. We are specifically interested in the strength of “symbolic 
barriers” between Muslims and majorities that indicate a socio-cultural distance between 
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them over the presence of Islam as a minority religion. We think that how Muslims of 
immigrant origin are perceived by the majority, and how they see themselves being accepted, 
or not, will importantly shape their individual life chances, and also their trajectory for social 
integration as a group in their societies of settlement. 
 
Even in largely secular European societies, resonant public conflicts over cultural/religious 
difference matter because they mark all Muslims out as a single group and reify their 
supposed characteristics as a “problem” for liberal societies, regardless of which generation 
they come from, their family country of origin, and degree of religiosity. Viewed from the 
perspective of Muslims, however, the expression of Islamic belief is not a “homeland 
hangover”, but increasingly a source of identification for second and third generations, who 
attempt to find a place between their parents’ culture and rejection in their country of birth. 
Higher religiosity among second generation Muslims than their peers is not only a revival of 
faith, but a reaction to the opposition and discrimination they face – “reactive religiosity” 
(Connor 2010). Demands by the children of immigrants for religious rights and cultural 
recognition are stronger than those of their parents’ generation. In Europe, research shows 
that Muslims make most public demands for minority groups rights, and that public debates 
about groups rights are mostly about the accommodation of Islam (Koopmans et al. 2005). 
 
While Europe’s relation to her Muslim immigrants is distinct from the U.S. experience (Alba 
and Foner 2015), we still consider that the important variations between European countries 
merit investigation, given that they have different institutional approaches for extending 
rights to Muslims, based on their specific church-state relations and minority politics 
(Koopmans et al. 2005). Cross-national variations in the legal and institutional incorporation 
of Islam in Europe are well established (Fetzer and Soper 2005). The main question is 
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whether religion is a bridge or a barrier to minority integration (Foner and Alba 2008)? While 
most scholars see Islam as a barrier in Europe, there are disagreements about the provenance 
and strength of this barrier. Some argue Islam is a resilient barrier to adaption because 
European societal institutions and national identities remain significantly anchored in 
Christianity and do not make equal room for Islam (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Foner and Alba 
2008). Against this, Joppke (2009) argues that European liberal nation-states have 
importantly extended Muslim group rights, precisely because their legal and constitutional 
institutions uphold liberal norms, often in the face of public opposition. In this view, public 
sentiments should not be confused with public institutions, which due to the prevalence of 
liberal norms cannot operate unchallenged on an ethnocentric basis, so that: “religion, 
particularly Islam, may still be more “barrier” than “bridge” to including immigrants in 
Europe but only as a matter of mentalities, not of institutions.” (Joppke and Torpey 2013, 
141–142). 
 
So far, however, there has been very little research on these public “mentalities” that build 
the barriers between Muslims and majorities, and how these relate to state approaches in their 
respective societies. This study compares Britain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands: 
countries with the most sizeable Muslim populations of immigrant origin in Western Europe 
(Buijs and Rath 2002; Alba and Foner 2015) and distinctive policy approaches for Islam 
(Koenig 2007). We examine public opinions on the place of Islam in state schooling, a field 
where the outcomes of controversies will clearly shape the socialization processes of the next 
generations. Our primary analysis is over whether teachers should be allowed to wear 
(Christian and Islamic) religious symbols in schools, and whether religious classes should be 
allowed for Christians and Muslims.  
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Schooling is an important domain to examine Muslim inclusion, because this is where the 
state acts in attempting to socialize the next generations into the values, identities and ideas 
of who belongs to the national community (Gellner 1983). Schools are especially important 
for the children of immigrants, not only because of the importance of educational attainment 
to achieving upward social mobility, but because this is their first formative lived experience 
of engagement with the state and how the state addresses issues of minority needs and 
discrimination in society. For the second generation, whether provisions are made for 
practicing Islam on the same basis as other minority or majority religions in schools, 
demonstrates the state’s degree of formal inclusion of their faith. However, regardless of the 
degree of formal inclusion of provisions for Islam, or not, within the curriculum, it also 
matters whether this is controversial, and the degree of opposition that it faces from the 
majority population, because this will shape the second generation’s feelings and experiences 
of belonging to the community. By examining the strength of barriers to religious rights for 
Muslims in public attitudes, we gain insight into whether cultural/religious difference is a 
special additional barrier to integration that confronts Muslims of immigrant origin in 
Europe.  
Multiculturalism and the Challenge of Islamic Rights to Liberal Democracies  
In contrast to the prevalence of race in the U.S., public controversies over multiculturalism in 
Europe are dominated by questions over the extension of rights to Muslims. But what is the 
substance of these claims and counter-claims? The label multiculturalism is often used 
loosely to refer to any cultural diversity (Koopmans 2013). It is more useful to apply a 
narrower definition as group specific rights, exemptions and recognition for minorities. Here 
minority ‘group rights’ exhibit two features: first, if granted, group rights go beyond the set 
of common civil and political rights of individual citizenship protected in all liberal 
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democracies; second, if realised, group rights constitute the recognition and accommodation 
by the state of the distinctive identity and cultural needs of the minority (Statham et al. 2005). 
Examples include policies allowing exemptions from rules and obligations, state support for 
separate institutions, special facilities in public institutions such as schools and media, 
representation rights for ethnic/religious organisations, and affirmative action. Of course, 
group claims are made by a wide range of ethnic, national and racial minorities, but our focus 
is on those for differential treatment in the name of religion. We use Carol and Koopmans’ 
definition (2013, 166-7): “Claims about religious rights then contest entitlements regarding 
the performance (e.g. to be buried according to Islamic prescriptions) or non-performance 
(e.g. dispensation from mixed swimming classes) of certain actions for religious reasons, or 
they are about entitlements that require others to perform (e.g. to create prayer spaces in 
schools) or refrain from performing (e.g. not to depict the Prophet Mohammed) certain 
actions for religious reasons.” 
Regarding the supposed challenge of religious demands by Muslims, a first point is that the 
idea of a unitary citizenship based on equal individual rights on which liberalism rests is an 
ideology, not an accurate depiction for most liberal nation-states. Most states already attribute 
some group rights and privileges in the form of corporatist or federal arrangements, and 
importantly –as we show shortly- give preferential treatment to specific religions over others. 
While some Muslim group demands are for parity with other religious groups, others go 
further, requesting exceptional treatment. Exceptional demands are not easy to accommodate, 
when they challenge the very essence of liberal values. For example, Muslims who practice 
polygamy, female circumcision, or Sharia divorce, are committing acts that contradict most 
liberal states’ legal and moral understandings of individual equality between men and 
women. How common or representative such practices are is not clear. We suspect they are 
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not very common at all, though when they occur, they gain a disproportionately high 
resonance from a mainstream media keen to comment on the novelty of this cultural 
difference of immigrants.   
Also the global Islamic upsurge is not only a political movement, but a revival of 
commitments with explicitly religious underpinnings (Berger, 1999). It involves a restoration 
of Islamic beliefs and lifestyles based on ideas about religion and the state, women, and the 
moral codes of everyday behaviour, which often contradict the modern ideas of European 
liberal states. Islam is not just a “homeland hangover” brought by immigrants, but a source of 
identification for second and third generations, who attempt to find a place between their 
parents’ culture and rejection in their country of birth. Many who wear the dress and 
accoutrements of Islam are educated professionals, the sons and daughters of assimilated 
immigrants. This revival of Islam is “Made in Europe” - a combination of the second 
generation’s faith, reactions to difficult integration processes, and perceived hostility. 
Although played out through symbols, such as headscarves and minarets, conflicts over Islam 
are also about the distribution of material resources. Migrants’ religious demands in public 
education or welfare, where the state is responsible for distributing services, challenge a pre-
existing institutionalized context in which the majority white population has real stakes too. 
This is why cultural conflicts often take place in public institutional settings where the state 
balances its obligations for minority provision against the pressures and possible political 
backlash of majority demands. A large proportion of the resonance over Islamic group 
demands actually comes in the form of reactions by representatives of the majority public. 
While some politicians are sincere in upholding what they see as liberal principles, this often 
leads to ethno-nationalist claims, where issues become distorted under emotive rhetoric about 
assumed national values and identities that “other” Muslims in the public domain.  
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In sum, religion matters a great deal in understanding European controversies over Muslims. 
First, although European societies are mostly secular, Christian religions play influential 
institutional social and political roles, irrespective of the small number of practicing 
worshippers. These church/state relations define the political environment into which 
immigrant religions have to negotiate a space for their community. Second, religious 
identification is a belief system that can shape an individual’s core identity and behaviour. A 
religious migrant may consider practicing religion a sacred duty that cannot be compromised. 
While states consciously try to shape migrants’ civic attitudes through integration policies, 
they do not to the same degree for religious faith, not least because liberal states uphold 
freedom of religious practice. Third, the nature of the immigrant religion influences how 
migrants can adapt when faced by the dominant culture. In this respect, the public duties of 
worship associated with Islam can be more obtrusive within the European societies, than 
those of immigrant minority religions, such as Hinduism, where worship takes place in a way 
that is less publicly visible.  
Variations in the State Accommodation of Islam  
 
The sizeable literature on cross-national variations emphasizes how historical resolutions of 
church-state conflicts have shaped the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion in 
Europe (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Statham et al. 2005; Koenig 2007; Soper and Fetzer 2007; 
Laurence 2012). There is considerable agreement on prominent features that define 
church/state separations. France, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany represent four distinct 
institutional types of religious accommodation, here understood as “opportunity structures” 
(Koopmans and Statham 2000), that importantly influence the degree and form to which 
Islam has been incorporated through an extension of rights to Muslims. We examine how 
distinct approaches to the accommodation of religious rights relate to patterns of public 
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attitudes (between Muslim minorities and Majorities) by using individual level data. This 
matters because, so far, there has been little comparative empirical research on whether 
public attitudes reflect the institutional degree of accommodation of Islam, or not. We present 
the basic cross-national variations in our countries’ traditions for church/state relations, to 
provide context for the subsequent analyses.  
 
France, under the concept of laïcité, is the archetypal secularist case, where there is a strict 
church-state separation that provides little space for religion in public life and institutions. 
The French state and public institutions are committed to secularism and even the role of 
Christian churches is restricted in the public sphere. As a consequence of laïcité, the French 
state has been resistant to the idea of separate institutions, such as schools, for religious 
groups, and displays of religiosity in public environments. In France there is a broad 
consensus that civil servants should not display visible markers of religion. In a context 
where even Catholic institutions, such as schools, receive far less state support and 
recognition than elsewhere, Islam has faced difficulties in finding an institutional foothold 
within a restrictive state framework (Laurence 2012). 
 
The Dutch case stands in stark contrast to French laïcité. In the Netherlands church/state 
relations evolved around the logic of “pillarisation” as a consequence of ideological struggles 
between Catholic, Protestant and secular groups in the late nineteenth century. Pillarisation 
entails a denominational segregation of society where religious or ideological groups have 
the right to establish their own social infrastructure with state support. Hence Dutch church-
state relations follow a tradition for: non-interference of the state in religious self-governance, 
which was broadly defined to include religious schools, hospitals, cultural and welfare 
institutions, and a range of other sectors. The compromise also entailed full state funding—on 
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an equal basis for all denominations—for these sectors (Koopmans 2013). Although actual 
pillarisation died out in the 1960s, its imprint is still influential as a logic embedded in 
institutional arrangements and law, and served as a reference point for how to accommodate 
Muslim rights (Carol and Koopmans 2013). In this context, Muslims and other newcomer 
religious minorities have found it relatively easy to claim group rights granted to other 
religious denominations, while the state has traditionally refrained from preventing the 
expression of minority religions in public institutions. 
 
Britain has an official state Christian church that is privileged over others. The Church of 
England is led by the Queen, as Head of State, while more than 20 Anglican Bishops sit in 
the second chamber. In Britain, the privileges that the state grants the Church of England are 
not automatically extended to other religious groups. Nonetheless, a pragmatic form of 
accommodation has proceeded, with the state relatively willing to grant rights to newer 
religions, a process supported in a paternalistic way by the Church of England. As Soper and 
Fetzer (2007, 936) state: “importantly, the presence of an established church and its close 
links with politics and public policy in Britain encouraged Muslim groups to look to the state 
for recognition of their religious rights and public policy needs.”. Overall, this has provided a 
considerable degree of parity between religions over time, while elites have been relatively 
supportive of demands to extend rights to Muslims on an equal basis to other minority 
religions, though full parity has not been achieved (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Statham et al. 
2005).  
 
In Germany, state recognition is extended to several Christian (especially Catholic) and 
Jewish religious denominations as public corporations, a formal status that entails privileges, 
including to receive Church taxes collected by the government, organise religious education 
 10 
in state schools, and provide social welfare services (Soper and Fetzer 2007). Crucially, the 
German state has so far not been willing to extend the public corporation status to Islam that 
it has afforded the Christian and Jewish denominations. This requirement for formal status 
has proven to be a barrier that has made it relatively difficult for Muslims to gain group rights 
(Laurence 2012). In addition, a strong imprint of Christianity remains in German liberalism 
that has been less accommodating than the establishment Church variant in Britain. Joppke 
(2009, 123) makes this point in his analysis of the legal basis of German headscarf bans: 
“This is a case where Muslims are really excluded from a certain ‘Christian-occidental’ self-
definition of the state, simply because one cannot be Christian and Muslim at the same time. 
This is the identity that transpires in the headscarf laws of the Catholic-conservative Länder.” 
Another factor in Germany is the difficulty for migrant minorities to gain access to formal 
citizenship relative to France, Britain and the Netherlands (Koopmans et al. 2005). Muslims 
of immigrant origin are less able to demand parity of treatment to others when significant 
numbers of them remain formally non-nationals and lacking in political leverage. 
 
Comparatively, the Dutch and the British church-state traditions have been more open to 
accommodating Islam as a new minority religion. In particular, the Dutch form of group-
based pluralism inherited from pillarisation allows a greater and relatively equal recognition 
of minority religions and favourable opportunities for Muslims to stake their group claims. 
Britain’s relative openness and accommodating approach is more elite-led and top-down with 
the aim of avoiding conflict with religious minorities. The Church of England has 
importantly supported Muslim rights, but retains its position at the top of the hierarchy. In 
Germany, a combination of high formal barriers to state recognition and status and relatively 
low political influence due to high barriers for migrant populations to gain access to 
citizenship is not conducive for Muslims. While in France, Muslims face very high barriers to 
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religious rights, not least because even Christian churches have historically been denied many 
privileges and rights within a context of strict state secularism.  
 
There are two important dimensions of variation: the degree to which Muslim group rights 
are accommodated; and the degree to which Christian religions are privileged over others. 
First, the Netherlands and Britain have been relatively much more accommodating to Muslim 
group demands than France and Germany. Second, in Britain and Germany, Christian 
churches are substantially privileged relative to other religions. By comparison, the 
Netherlands and France treat religions in a relatively more equal way, notwithstanding that 
the Dutch are relatively inclusive, and the French exclusive.  
 
Approach, method and datai   
 
We use data from an original survey conducted within a EU Framework project EurIslamii 
(Statham and Tillie 2016). The data were collected through Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interviews (CATI) in 2010/2011. The survey oversamples people with a migrant background 
and includes more than 5000 respondents. In each country, we interviewed migrant 
minorities from four important Muslim-origin countries (former-Yugoslavia; Turkey; 
Pakistan; Morocco). This “Muslim” sample was drawn by onomastic procedure: common 
family and first names were sampled from the latest electronic phonebooks. Respondents 
were screened to see if they, or one of their parents, were Muslims, and from our selected 
countries of origin. Bi-lingual interviewers were used allowing respondents to choose their 
preferred language. In addition, we collected a Majority (non-Muslim) sample randomly in 
each country. Efforts were made to ensure gender balance in all samples. Table 1 shows the 
samples. 
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-Table 1 about here- 
 
From the survey, we selected questions relating to an extension of religious rights in state 
schools: (1) allowing religious symbols on schoolteachers’ clothing and (2) the provision of 
religious in the school curriculum. For both we can compare responses about religious rights 
for Christianity and Islam.  
 
We compare variations between groups within a country, instead of groups regardless of 
country. Because our respondents live in distinct national, legal, policy and interpretative 
contexts for understanding religious rights, their opinions (for or against religious rights) 
mean something substantively different dependent on their respective national country 
context. A respondent living in Britain, whose child goes to a school where a teacher wears a 
religious headscarf, and is institutionally and legally empowered to do so, is clearly relating 
to a different interpretive and institutional world than one in France, where this would be 
inconceivable and legally impossible. The normal in Britain and France is very different 
precisely because of their distinct state approaches to Islam and Christianity. The scales for 
agreement/disagreement in our survey are therefore best employed to measure relative 
differences between individuals (from majority and minority groups) within a country.  
 
We also try to avoid the pitfall of lumping all Muslims together, by allowing for examination 
of differences between Muslims with backgrounds in four countries of origin (former-
Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey).  
 
Allowing teachers to wear religious symbols in schools?  
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Historically, states use education systems as an important nation-building tool. Schools are 
important agents for socializing the next generations into the values, identities and ideas of 
who belongs to a national community (Gellner 1983). This is why schools have regularly 
been the institutional location for public and legal disputes over the place of religion in 
society, generally, and specifically over Islam. Conflicts over whether pupils or teachers can 
wear veils or crucifixes in a state school are common. Teachers perform a special role in 
schools as public servants acting on behalf of, and as employees of, the state. Hence whether 
teachers are banned from wearing religious symbols in their professional role is a good 
indicator for a state’s accommodation of a religion. 
 
Regarding actual situations, we find variations: In 2008, no religious symbols were allowed 
in French primary and secondary schools. Britain and the Netherlands were more 
accommodating. Teachers were permitted to wear the Islamic veil, while Christian religious 
symbols were already accepted in state education. In Germany, Christianity was strongly 
present in education, while teachers were banned from wearing the veil in some Laender, 
although the Federal Court ruled there was no clear legal basis for this in 2003 (ICRI).  
 
We have two questions on teachers’ attire and religious symbols: one on Christian symbols 
and clothing, and one on the Islamic veil. This allows us to compare respondents’ opinions 
over provision for the majority religion and Islam.  
  
Our survey asks:  
‘Several aspects of state-religion relations have recently been under discussion in 
<France/Germany/the Netherlands/the UK>. Do you agree or disagree with the following 
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statements? 
(a) Teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear visible Christian symbols such 
as a cross or a nun’s habit. 
(b) Teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear a Veil.’ 
(order of questions randomised) 
 
The tables show the main findings.iii Scores show the adjusted means for a group’s responses 
on a four-point scale after controlling for age, educational level and income. Note that the 
questions are worded negatively, so agreement indicates an opinion against religious 
symbols. However, we adjusted the data, so that a mean above 2.5 moving towards 4 
indicates increasing disagreement with an extension of religious rights, and below 2.5 
towards 1, increasing agreement. The columns show the results within each country. The 
Majority row gives the adjusted mean score for the non-Muslim sample. The subsequent four 
rows show adjusted means for the four Muslim groups (ex-Yugoslavian; Pakistani; 
Moroccan; Turkish), respectively. The * symbol shows when this opinion is highly 
significantly different from the majority opinion (at **p < .01, *** p < .001). The “Muslim” 
mean is a score calculated from the means of the four Muslim groups (weighted) per country. 
Last, the Majority/Muslim gap shows the distance between the majority and Muslim means.  
 
-Tables 2a and 2b- 
 
Table 2a shows findings on teachers wearing symbols associated with the majority Christian 
religions. First, we see the strong imprint of laïcité in the French majority and Muslim 
minority relative to those in other countries. The French majority respondents have the 
strongest disagreement with teachers being allowed to wear Christian symbols of all groups, 
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and are the only group apart from Moroccan Muslims in France, and former-Yugoslavian 
Muslims in Britain, who register on the disagreement side of the scale. By contrast, in 
countries where the state incorporates Christian religions to a greater degree, and allows 
teachers to wear clothes signifying Christianity, respondents from the majority are clearly 
against banning Christian symbols. This applies to the Netherlands, but to a greater degree to 
Germany, and especially Britain, the two countries where the state significantly privileges 
Christian religions.  
 
Second, turning to Muslim respondents, their overall positions in countries where the state 
incorporates Christianity, the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany, “agree” with permitting 
Christian symbols for teachers’ attire. This Muslim support for Christian symbols in state 
schools is most likely because Muslims understand that an expansion of rights for Islam is 
often best legitimated by a demand for parity with the majority religion. It is harder for liberal 
states to deny rights to some that that are already extended to others (Joppke 2009). Even in 
laïc France, the overall Muslim mean is equivalent to neutral, showing neither support nor 
opposition to Christianity in schools in a context where it is denied. So overall, we witness no 
Muslim opposition to the actual (or in France possible) state accommodation of Christianity 
in this form. This goes against the idea of a “Christianity versus Islam” boundary along 
religious divisions driven and constructed by Muslim minorities. On the contrary, Muslims’ 
relative support for Christian religious rights is indicative of a more pragmatic approach to 
their own religious accommodation. Regarding the gaps between the majority and Muslim 
minorities over Christian group rights, it is only in France that Christianity in schools clearly 
divides the majority and all four resident Muslim minority groups. Here the strong imprint of 
laïcité in the French majority’s opinions, who on aggregate “disagree” with teachers wearing 
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Christian symbols in schools, means that former-Yugoslavs, Pakistanis and Turks are highly 
significantly different from the majority, while Moroccans just miss significance.  
 
However, when we turn to opinions over teachers wearing the Muslim veil, we see from 
Table 2b that there is a clear dividing line between the majority population and Muslim 
minorities in all four countries. The opinions of all four groups of Muslim origin in all four 
countries of settlement are highly significantly different from the majority view, with the 
exception of former-Yugoslavians in the Netherlands and Germany. Among Muslims, we see 
that those who most likely came as refugees from the ethno-religious wars that tore 
Yugoslavia apart, tend to be less in favour of religious rights, than Muslims with origins in 
Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey. 
  
By comparing Tables 2a and 2b, we can unpack some important features of the changes in 
opinion that occur as the question shifts from group rights for Christians to Muslims. First, 
the overall aggregate Muslim means are remarkably similar for teachers’ wearing Christian 
or Islamic symbols across all countries. This shows that Muslims agree to accommodating 
religious symbols in state schools for their own and the majority Christian religions to the 
same degree. Again, we think that this similar level of support for their own minority religion 
and Christianity comes from the importance of demanding parity with a majority religion for 
advancing Muslim group rights. However, it demonstrates a second important feature of the 
significant gap between the majority and Muslims over teachers wearing the veil, namely, 
that it is produced by a change in the opinions of respondents from the majority populations 
as the question shifts from Christian to Muslim rights. It is the majority populations’ 
opposition to the veil that drives the relationship and produces the significant gaps. Only in 
the Netherlands where teachers can wear the Islamic headscarf does the majority remain 
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neutral overall, while in Germany, and especially in France and Britain, the majority agrees 
strongly with banning teachers from wearing the veil. This may not be a surprise for the 
France, where the veil is banned for teachers, nor Germany where there is a mixed policy, but 
where again the veil is banned in some Federal States. However, the British majority’s very 
strong opposition is exceptional in that it goes directly against the country’s policies for not 
banning teachers from wearing the veil. 
  
Here it is worth pointing out that the shift in majority opinions when the question moves from 
Christian to Muslim rights is largest in Britain, and then Germany, compared to the 
Netherlands and France. Britain and Germany are the two countries whose church-state 
accommodations especially privilege Christian religions over other religions, while the 
Netherlands is relatively more equally accommodating to all religions, and France equally 
unaccommodating to all. From this, it seems that granting special privileges to Christian 
religions over others provides legitimacy for majorities to also discriminate in their views and 
support provision for Christians, but not Muslims. For Britain, the argument is that 
maintaining the status of a privileged state Church, the Church of England, does more to 
uphold a sense of Christian privilege in the minds of the majority than the extension of 
Muslim group rights does to undermine it. The British majority clearly agree with teachers 
being allowed to wear Christian symbols and attire, but disagree strongly with an extension 
of this right to Muslims, even though this is what actually happens. In Germany, where 
Muslims communities have less of a foothold in society, generally, because of restrictive 
citizenship, and Christian churches are clearly granted privileges that are not extended to 
Islam, this discriminating stance of the majority in prioritising Christian rights is less 
surprising.  
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In sum, the British findings are especially striking. The British majority’s strong agreement 
with banning teachers from wearing the veil produces a large gap between Muslims and non-
Muslims that is almost twice the size of that in France, where the laïcité conditions make 
teachers wearing a veil an absolute non-starter.  
 
Allowing Religious Education in schools?  
 
Another query to test opinions on whether group rights should be included within state 
provision addresses religious education (RE) in state schooling. We replicate the design 
applied for teachers’ clothing and religious symbols and ask questions that allow comparison 
between provision for Christian and Islamic religions. In part, this is to verify our earlier 
findings, given that references to the veil might provoke atypical emotive responses from 
respondents, or that the negative wording of the question might produce distorting effects. 
Our focus on the place of majority and minority religions in the curriculum of state education 
goes to the core of questions about the public and institutional incorporation of religion, not 
least because it is through their education systems that states seek to generate their preferred 
values and national identities. 
  
With regard to the factual state of affairs facing our respondents, in 2008, Britain, the 
Netherlands and Germany allowed provision for Christian RE but had not extended this to 
Islamic RE on an equal basis. In Britain, parents were able to request that local councils on 
religious education install Islamic classes. This led to some state schools offering Islamic RE 
in areas with dense Muslim populations. Similarly, in the Netherlands, there is a partial form 
of acceptance. In Germany, there had been only very few pilot projects for Islamic RE classes 
by 2008, due to the subordinate position of Islam relative to the Christianity in the state’s 
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hierarchy of religious recognition. In France, the exclusion of religious instruction from state 
schooling meant that provision for Islam was a non-starter (ICRI). 
  
The survey asks whether respondents agree or disagree with two statements: 
(a) Public schools should offer Christian religious education for those who want it.  
(b) Public schools should offer Muslim religious education for those who want it.  
(order of questions randomised) 
 
Table 3a shows the adjusted means for groups’ opinions over Christian RE in state schools. 
In line with the findings on religious attire, the main dividing line is between laïc France and 
the three countries where state education includes Christian Churches to a greater degree. 
First, the impact of laïcité is clear on the French majority’s opinions, they are the only group 
who on aggregate “disagree” with Christian RE for those who want it. By contrast, all four 
groups of Muslim origin in France agree with the proposition to a degree that is highly 
significantly different from the majority. This produces a gap between the French majority 
and Muslims that is significantly wider than in the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany, where 
there is a relative majority and Muslim consensus in favour of this right for Christians. 
Support for Christian religious instruction in schools is especially strong among the German 
majority. But it is also evident for the British majority, who like their German counterparts 
live in a country where the state especially privileges Christian religions over others. In the 
Netherlands, where religious accommodation is relatively more equal across different 
religions, the Dutch majority on aggregate favours Christian RE, but less decisively. Turning 
to the Muslim aggregate means, we see that in all countries Muslims broadly “agree” with 
Christian RE provision. This confirms the earlier finding that Muslims tend to support 
Christian rights, probably thinking that this is more conducive for a spill over of rights to 
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their own religion. Again, this indicates a pragmatic stance, with no evidence of a sizable 
Muslim opposition to Christianity simply because it is a different religion. When the question 
shifts to state provision of RE for Muslims (Table 3b), we also find a similar overall pattern 
to the earlier findings on teachers’ wearing religious attire. First, there are clearly divided 
opinions in all countries between the majority and Muslims. With the exception of former-
Yugoslavs in the Netherlands, all groups with Muslim origins in all countries are highly 
significantly different in their views to the majority, and more in agreement with allowing 
Islamic RE. 
 
-Tables 3a and 3b- 
 
Once more we see that Muslims in the Netherlands, France and Germany, hold similar views 
on RE provision for Christians and Muslims. It is only in Britain where Muslims shift in their 
views to be more in agreement with this right for themselves than for Christians. Also, among 
the Muslims groups, the former-Yugoslavs are relatively less in favor of this Muslim group 
right than the others, but with the exception of the Netherlands, much closer to the Pakistani, 
Moroccan and Turkish groups than the majority.  
 
Again following the pattern that we observed earlier, it is the majority groups’ relative shift 
in opinion against provision for Muslims compared to Christians that leads to important 
‘gaps’ between the majority population and Muslims. Also this shift in majority opinions is 
greatest in Britain and Germany, the two countries that privilege Christian religions in their 
state accommodation over other religions. The shift is less pronounced in the Netherlands, 
where state accommodation generally treats religions more equally, and France, where they 
are all relatively equally excluded. 
 21 
  
The overall findings bear some imprints of the countries’ respective forms of church-state 
accommodation. French majority-supported state laïcité leads to a wide Majority/Muslim gap 
(1.01) and few prospects for an extension of religious rights to Muslims. The French majority 
are unlikely to support rights for Muslims that are denied to Christians. In the Netherlands, 
where the state treats religions relatively equally and RE for Muslims is partially 
accommodated, the Majority/Muslim gap (0.37) remains significant, but is the smallest of the 
four countries. In Germany, state inclusion of (especially) Christian religions but not Islam, 
leads to an overall strong majority support for religious provision compared to other 
countries, but also a relatively strong reaction by the majority against specific provision for 
Muslims (German gap: 0.46). We also see a similarly strong reaction by the British majority 
respondents when the question switches from provision for Christians to Muslims. In the 
British case, this is supplemented by an assertiveness of Muslims for an extension of rights to 
them relative to Christians. 
  
The British findings are remarkable. For a country with some degree of state accommodation 
for religious classes for Muslims, it is striking that the British majority shows a clear 
opposition to this policy and makes a very clear distinction in its support for Christian rights 
and opposition to extending the same rights for Muslims. Conversely, British Muslims 
support Christian rights, but advocate support for their own religious rights to a greater 
degree, no doubt encouraged to expect parity from an institutional system that goes a long 
way to providing it on many issues. As a consequence, we witness a polarization between the 
opinions of the majority and Muslims in Britain as the question shifts from Christian to 
Muslim provision. This results in a striking gap (1.06) along ethno-religious lines between 
the British Muslims and non-Muslims, driven from both sides. It shows a wide socio-cultural 
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distance in the views of ordinary people and a potential for conflict between the British 
majority and Muslims over Islamic group rights.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
  
Overall, regardless of the degree to which states accommodate Islam, we find highly 
significant “barriers” between majority populations and Muslims over what the provision for 
religious rights for Muslims should be in all four countries. While earlier comparative studies 
found that institutional approaches to minority integration and cultural pluralism importantly 
shape the field of public claims-making mobilized by collective actors and carried by mass 
media (Koopmans et al. 2005), our key finding shows the relationship holds much less with 
regard to public attitudes. While findings on the Netherlands, Germany and France, support 
“opportunity structure” expectations to some degree, the British findings completely 
contradict the notion that accommodating policies lead to closer opinions between the 
majorities and Muslims. Britain is relatively accommodating towards Islam, but this 
combines with a majority public opinion that strongly opposes Muslim rights and produces 
the highest “barriers” of socio-cultural distance.  
 
Decades on from the first immigration waves we see relatively few signs of the cultural 
acceptance of Islam as a minority religion, at least when judged by public attitudes. Religious 
faith seems to be a particularly resilient form of Muslim identification in Europe, and at the 
same, this provokes strong reactions and resistance from largely secular majorities.  
 
Religion matters for majorities even in secular Europe. A striking finding is that majorities’ 
opinions turn against religious rights as the demand shifts from provision for Christians to 
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Muslims. This shift drives the relationship and results in highly significant socio-cultural 
distances. We also found that the shift in majority opinions for supporting Christian versus 
Islam provision was greatest in Britain and Germany, the two countries where states clearly 
prioritize Christian religions above others. The shift was markedly less in Netherlands, which 
is relatively more accommodating across religions, and France that is restrictive to all. This is 
not to suggest that people in Britain and Germany see themselves as more Christian, but that 
they find greater legitimacy for placing Christianity over Islam and in doing so they repeat 
the discrimination within their country’s approach to religious accommodation. For Britain, it 
seems that maintaining the status of a privileged state church, the Church of England, does 
more to uphold a sense of Christian privilege in the minds of the majority than the extension 
of Muslim group rights does to undermine it. Overall, majority opinions matter a great deal in 
determining the potential for controversy over Muslim religious rights.  
 
The strength of British majority opposition to Muslim group rights is exceptional. This large 
gap between supportive policies and oppositional majority public attitudes raises a number of 
issues. It underlines that a liberal state’s institutional approach towards Islam is clearly 
distinct from public sentiments about Islam. The two should not be conflated, because 
relatively liberal policies can be out of synch with oppositional public attitudes. This occurs 
when liberal states place obligations for protecting the cultural needs of (permanent) 
minorities over the popular majority view. It supports the view of Joppke and Torpey (2013) 
mentioned in the introduction. However, Joppke and Torpey underestimate the degree to 
which a state’s ability to do this over the long term is restricted by majoritarian politics. What 
we see in the UK is a significant opposition to Muslim religious rights that also constitutes a 
potential for politicians to seek votes by mobilizing populist anti-Muslim sentiments. A rise 
of ethno-nationalist populist politics that targets Islam, not only impacts negatively on (all, 
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not just religious) Muslims by stigmatization, but it also politically challenges the ability of a 
liberal state to live up to its ideals and support extensions of group rights to a minority 
religion. 
 
From the majority side, the difference of Islam as a religion and associated assumptions about 
cultural characteristics of Muslims have become an interpretive masterframe in the public 
domain for “explaining” problems of social integration. Such cultural “explanations” that 
simply lump all Muslims together as the same, regardless of immigration type, country of 
origin, faith, and degree of individual religiosity, etc., build a strong “barrier” that must be 
hard for individuals to break out from in the social world. Populist politicians reinforce these 
barriers, when they “explain” complex social integration problems by the “unwillingness of 
Muslims to assimilate” or “incompatibility of Islam and liberal democracy”. The power of 
populism is that it provides simple answers for complex social issues by blaming the cultural 
characteristics of an outgroup.   
 
Religious faith clearly matters for Muslims. However, our findings point towards Muslims 
making religious demands on a pragmatic and not a religious anti-Christian basis. Muslims 
supported religious rights for Christians within state education too. It seems that they see 
better opportunities to advance Islamic rights through a context that supports all religious 
rights. 
 
Most evidence indicates religiosity has not decreased among the second generation. But the 
Islam that remains resilient in Europe is different from that which came with the first 
immigration waves. It is “Made in Europe” and generated by living with rejection, while 
being stimulated by a global Islamic revival of commitments that have explicitly religious 
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underpinnings. According to our findings, second-generation Muslims in Europe face at best 
a lack of support and at worst outright opposition from the majority over practising their faith 
requirements. In some cases, the state has accommodated such practices, perhaps in the face 
of a lack of tolerance from the majority population. However, controversies in important 
socializing public institutions, such as state schools, must have had an impact on the second 
generation and their acculturation trajectory. The strong symbolic “barrier” that demarcates 
non-Muslims from Muslims in the social world marks them all out as “culturally different” 
irrespective of their individual trajectories of social integration in higher education or the 
labor market. In this sense, culture and religion matters a great deal in shaping life chances 
for Muslims, even in European societies that are largely secular. This is also a situation that 
against the linear expectations of classic assimilation theories the passage of time does not 
seem to erode, but reinforce. The “barriers” are strong, persistent and enduring. 
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Table 1: Sample of Respondents 
 
 Netherlands Britain France Germany 
Majority 385 385 385 390 
Ex-Yugoslav 151 200 150 255 
Turkish 250 350 250 355 
Moroccan 250 200 250 256 
Pakistani 152 350 150 162 
Total (n) 1188 1485 1185 1418 
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Table 2. Agreement/Disagreement with teachers being allowed to wear (a) visible 
Christian symbols, and (b) (Islamic) Veil, by group 
(scale 1-4: agree strongly 1; agree 2; disagree 3; disagree strongly 4) 
 
2a. 
Christian 
symbols 
Netherlands Britain France Germany 
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Majority 2.30 1.90 2.93 2.23 
Ex-Yugo 2.20  2.69*** 2.45*** 2.30 
Pakistani 2.09 2.01 2.36*** 2.06 
Moroccan 1.80*** 2.05 2.60 2.03 
Turkish 2.19 2.40*** 2.53** 2.41 
“Muslim” 2.07 2.29 2.48 2.20 
Majority/
Muslim 
Gap 
0.23 0.39 0.45 0.03 
 
2b. Islamic 
Veil 
Netherlands Britain France Germany 
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Majority 2.48 3.64 3.16 2.76 
Ex-Yugo 2.32 2.52*** 2.73** 2.62 
Pakistani 2.02*** 2.33*** 2.35*** 1.93*** 
Moroccan 1.73*** 2.14*** 2.34*** 2.10*** 
Turkish 2.14*** 2.31*** 2.37*** 2.25*** 
“Muslim” 2.05 2.33 2.45 2.23 
Majority/
Muslim 
Gap 
0.43 1.31 0.71 0.53 
(Group significantly different from Majority at *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 – Bonferroni pairwise 
comparison – shown only for subcategories of “Muslim” by family country of origin) 
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Table 3: Agreement/Disagreement with schools offering (a) Christian religious 
education, and (b) Muslim religious education, to those who want it, by group 
(scale 1-4: agree strongly 1; agree 2; disagree 3; disagree strongly 4) 
 
a. 
Christian 
Religious 
Education 
Netherlands Britain France Germany 
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Majority 2.32 2.15 2.80 1.57 
Ex-Yugo 2.25 2.27 2.30*** 1.79 
Pakistani 2.01*** 1.86*** 1.84*** 1.67 
Moroccan 2.00*** 2.01 2.15*** 1.85*** 
Turkish 2.29 2.05 2.07*** 1.86*** 
“Muslim” 2.14 2.05 2.09 1.79 
Majority/
Muslim 
Gap 
0.18 0.10 0.71 0.22 
 
b. Muslim 
Religious 
Education 
Netherlands Britain France Germany 
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Majority 2.56 2.75 3.01 2.17 
Ex-Yugo 2.43 1.96*** 2.41*** 1.87*** 
Pakistani 2.07*** 1.55*** 1.66*** 1.50*** 
Moroccan 2.02*** 1.55*** 1.84*** 1.77*** 
Turkish 2.25*** 1.72*** 2.07*** 1.70*** 
“Muslim” 2.19 1.69 2.00 1.71 
Majority/
Muslim 
Gap 
0.37 1.06 1.01 0.46 
(Group significantly different from Majority at *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 – Bonferroni pairwise 
comparison – shown only for subcategories of “Muslim” by family country of origin) 
 
 
i The analysis draws from Statham (2016). 
ii Funding support from the European Commission is gratefully acknowledged, reference: SSH-2007-3.1.1 grant 
215863. 
iii We conducted five (group: native; ex-Yugoslavian; Moroccan; Turkish; Pakistani) × two (gender: male; 
female) two-way analyses of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for age, educational level and income, for 
each country. We include age, education, and income as covariates, and gender as an independent variable, to 
see whether our findings hold, regardless of age, whether people are better educated or not, or how much they 
earn, plus we examine whether gender matters. In ANCOVA the test of whether groups’ means are the same is 
represented by the F-ratio and an associated significance value. A first general finding is that gender does not 
affect results, while group belonging matters a great deal in explaining variance. For this reason, we focus on 
group differences within the four countries, respectively. Our tables show the means adjusted for the effects of 
covariates and level of significance of Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons of these means.  
 
                                                     
